Caveat verdict
llm-shell-guard
Shell command safety guard skill providing allowlist-first policy, denylist, and approval gates for agent command execution; all described behavior is legitimate defensive security tooling with no malicious patterns.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (10)
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
README.md · code · rm -rf /
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
.github/workflows/test.yml · prose · downgraded · |
python
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
linux_command_guard/rules/denylist.txt · prose · downgraded · curl | sh
Pipe-to-shell pattern (wget | sh)
linux_command_guard/rules/denylist.txt · prose · downgraded · wget -qO- | sh
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
linux_command_guard/rules/denylist.txt · prose · downgraded · | bash
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
linux_command_guard/rules/denylist.txt · prose · downgraded · | sh
Accesses sensitive system files
README.md · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · sudo
os.system/popen — direct OS command execution
README.md · prose · downgraded · os.system(
Changes file ownership
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · chown
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.