Caveat verdict
security
lobsterai-security
Enterprise security framework providing audit logging, RBAC, input validation, output sanitization, and code scanning as a library for other skills; the framework itself implements protective measures with no signs of malicious behavior.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (17)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · | python
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · rm -rf /
Possible hardcoded credential
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · SECRET="your-32-byte-or-longer-secret-key
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md · code · eval(
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · sudo
References child_process — can spawn system processes
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · child_process
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md · prose · downgraded · curl evil.com\|sh
Accesses sensitive system files
TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md · prose · downgraded · |sh
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md · code · os.getenv(
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
dependency_scanner.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Sets world-executable permissions
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · chmod 755
Changes file ownership
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · chown
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · os.environ.get(
POSTs data to external URL
DEPLOYMENT.md · code · .post('https://
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md · prose · downgraded · exec(
os.system/popen — direct OS command execution
TECHNICAL_DOCUMENTATION.md · prose · downgraded · os.system(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.