ClawAudit verdict
locker-vault
Receives external input AND executes processes
Credential management skill that explicitly enforces secrets stay in Locker vault and never appear in output; it manages credentials for the user's own agent workflows with clear anti-leakage rules, which is exactly its stated purpose.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Receives external input AND executes processes — the shape of a command & control channel
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI10
Writes files AND executes processes — may drop and execute malicious scripts
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI05
Reads local files AND makes external network calls — the capabilities for data exfiltration co-occur (data-flow not verified)
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls
LLM02 · ASI03
Executes processes AND makes external network calls — may exfiltrate command output
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Accesses credentials AND writes files — may persist stolen credentials locally
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Both reads and writes files — verify scope is limited to intended directories
LLM06 · ASI02
Permission integrity
network_out
Findings (6)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://locker.io/secrets/install.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
Possible hardcoded credential
SKILL.md · code · token: 'vault://RD_CRM_API_TOKEN
References child_process — can spawn system processes
SKILL.md · code · child_process
File write/delete operation
SKILL.md · code
References webhook/callback URL
SKILL.md · code · webhook_url
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
process_execnetwork_outnetwork_incredential_accesscredential_storefile_readfile_write Thanks — recorded.