ClawAudit verdict
magento-admin
Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls
Magento 2 store administration skill using SSH key auth and the user's own server; explicitly scoped to owner-operated infrastructure, all credentials are user-supplied environment variables, and the skill documents that nothing is sent to third parties.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls
LLM02 · ASI03
Permission integrity
network_out
Findings (6)
Pipe-to-python pattern — remote code execution risk
SKILL.md · code · curl -s MAGENTO_OS_URL/_cluster/health 2>/dev/null | python
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SKILL.md · code · | python3
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · frontmatter · sudo
References SSH/GPG private keys
SKILL.md · frontmatter · SSH_KEY
Accesses .ssh directory
SKILL.md · frontmatter · .ssh/
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
SKILL.md · frontmatter · http://127.0.0.1
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class C). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
credential_storenetwork_outnetwork_incredential_access Thanks — recorded.