Caveat verdict

mailgo-campaign-suite

mailgo-coldmail-marketing

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Accesses credentials AND writes files

Cold email campaign skill using the Mailgo API; explicitly warns against pasting API keys in chat and instructs users to set them as env vars only, with all operations targeting the user's own Mailgo account.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
50
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND writes files — may persist stolen credentials locally

LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03

Permission integrity

Performs file operations but does not declare file-accessing binaries

file_read+write

Findings (5)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

SKILL.md · code · API_KEY="YOUR_TOKEN

Pattern match critical

<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection

SKILL.md · code · <script>

Pattern match high

Accesses shell history/config

SKILL.md · code · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/campaign_control.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

scripts/campaign_report.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

credential_accessfile_write
Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API