ClawAudit verdict
maverick-x-mcp
The skill searches, reads, and works with X posts, users, timelines, and search through a local XMCP wrapper, with no evidence of malicious behavior.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (6)
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/init-mcporter-oauth.sh · prose · downgraded · secret="${!mcp_client_secret_var:?${mcp_client_secret_var} required}
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
mcporter.json · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/local_http_invoke.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/local_http_invoke.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/local_http_invoke.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
scripts/server.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 4 environment variables. (3 sensitive: MAVERICK_X_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN, MAVERICK_X_MCP_REFRESH_TOKEN, MAVERICK_X_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET). Requires 2 system binaries.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.