Caveat verdict
max-auth
Deploys a local self-hosted auth server on 127.0.0.1 for biometric passkeys that guards sensitive agent actions; all behavior is protective and local with no exfiltration.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (8)
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
SKILL.md · code · http://127.0.0.1
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
assets/auth-server.js · prose · downgraded · <script>
Possible hardcoded credential
assets/auth-server.js · prose · downgraded · token=' + token.slice(0,8) +
Node http/https module — low-level network access
references/integration.md · code · require('http')
References child_process — can spawn system processes
assets/auth-server.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Base64 decode (atob) — may hide malicious payloads
assets/auth-server.js · prose · downgraded · atob(
Base64 encode (btoa) — may obfuscate data exfiltration
assets/auth-server.js · prose · downgraded · btoa(
String.fromCharCode — can build strings to evade detection
assets/auth-server.js · prose · downgraded · String.fromCharCode
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_inpackage_installnetwork_out Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.