ClawAudit verdict

morgana-mordred-security-sandbox

mordred-security-sandbox

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Penetration testing sandbox with 5 intentionally vulnerable systems for security training; explicitly designed for controlled local testing with Docker isolation, no exfiltration or external attack infrastructure present.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
90
transparency
90
maintenance

Findings (11)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

SKILL.md · code · password = "anything

Pattern match critical

Dynamic __import__('os') — Python OS command execution

SKILL.md · code · __import__('os')

Pattern match critical

Prompt injection — tries to override agent instructions

SKILL.md · code · ignore previous instructions

Pattern match critical

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

skills/security-analysis.md · code · eval(

Pattern match high

Possible prompt injection — attempts to redefine agent identity

SKILL.md · code · You are now

Pattern match high

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

skills/security-analysis.md · code · exec(

Pattern match high

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

skills/security-analysis.md · code · subprocess.run(

Pattern match high

Accesses sensitive system files

src/systems/weak_sandbox.py · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd

Pattern match medium

subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector

src/systems/weak_sandbox.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

vaccines/vaccine_data_leak.py · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match low

Popular HTTP library — network access

vaccines/vaccine_flawed_auth.py · prose · downgraded · Got

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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