Caveat verdict

ms-todo-oauth

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Microsoft To Do CLI client using OAuth authorization-code flow against Microsoft Graph for managing the user's own tasks; package_install is for Python dependencies and the skill transparently warns about built-in fallback credentials being public.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

30
security
50
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (6)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

SKILL.md · code · SECRET = "<your-client-secret>

Pattern match medium

References webhook/callback URL

SKILL.md · code · callback_url

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

scripts/ms-todo-oauth.py · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

scripts/test_ms_todo_oauth.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match low

Python os.getenv — reads environment variable

scripts/ms-todo-oauth.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

scripts/test_ms_todo_oauth.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

package_installnetwork_in

Is this flag fair?

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