Caveat verdict
myclaw-backup
Backup/restore skill with explicit security model: backup.sh has no network access and the HTTP server enforces mandatory auth tokens, restricting shell-execution endpoints to localhost only.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
Findings (8)
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/restore.sh · prose · downgraded · token = '${CURRENT_GATEWAY_TOKEN}
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
scripts/server.js · prose · downgraded · | bash
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
references/what-gets-saved.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
References child_process — can spawn system processes
scripts/server.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
References agent memory files
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md
Sets world-executable permissions
scripts/restore.sh · prose · downgraded · chmod 700
Node http/https module — low-level network access
scripts/server.js · prose · downgraded · require('http')
Accesses sensitive environment variables
scripts/server.js · prose · downgraded · process.env.BACKUP_TOKEN
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/C/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 5 system binaries. (1 elevated: rsync).
network_innetwork_out Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.