ClawAudit verdict

nautilus-trader

nautilus-trader-pro

45
🟠 Risky
Significant concerns — only install if you understand the risks

Setup instructions show `curl https://sh.rustup.rs -sSf | sh -s -- -y` and `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh` as required installation steps; while these are well-known open-source installers, they represent concrete curl|sh patterns that execute remotely fetched code.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
80
transparency
90
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (5)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl https://sh.rustup.rs -sSf | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | sh

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

references/live_trading.md · code · API_KEY="your_key

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

SKILL.md · code · sudo

Pattern match high

apt-get install — installs system packages

SKILL.md · code · apt-get install

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

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