ClawAudit verdict

number-two-migration

45
🟠 Risky
Significant concerns — only install if you understand the risks

The skill embeds what appears to be a real Moltbook API key ('moltbook_sk_4fM49PqzeqgI8jB5-qpV4x_CjiXAHHWW') in plaintext and references a truncated second API key, and it installs broad identity/memory/config files plus runs setup-api-keys.sh automatically, creating meaningful risk of credential exposure and unreviewed persistent agent reconfiguration.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

55
security
70
transparency
70
maintenance

Findings (5)

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

config/skills/skills-auto-trigger.md · prose · downgraded · API_KEY="moltbook_sk_...

Pattern match medium

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

config/memory/2026-03-06.md · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match medium

Accesses shell history/config

install.sh · prose · downgraded · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match low

References agent memory files

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md

Pattern match low

Opens WebSocket connection

config/memory/heartbeat-state-backup-2026-03-08.json · prose · downgraded · WebSocket

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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