Caveat verdict

openclaw

openclaw-agent-skill

🟢 Trusted

No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

OpenClaw documentation reference skill that reads official docs from local docs/ folder; no capabilities declared and the content is entirely documentation routing with no suspicious behavior.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

security

transparency

maintenance

Findings (21)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

docs/02-installation.md · code · curl -fsSL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

docs/02-installation.md · code · | bash

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

docs/02-installation.md · code · rm -rf ~

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

docs/05-providers.md · code · API_KEY="vapi_xxxxxxxxxxxx

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

docs/13-deploy.md · code · | sh

Pattern match critical

Command substitution with curl — remote code execution

docs/13-deploy.md · code · bash -c "$(curl

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

docs/02-installation.md · code · sudo

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

docs/02-installation.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match high

Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly

docs/13-deploy.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json

Pattern match high

Accesses shell history/config

docs/02-installation.md · code · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match high

apt-get install — installs system packages

docs/02-installation.md · code · apt-get install

Pattern match high

Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime

docs/07-automation.md · code · import('

Pattern match high

Accesses system credential store

docs/10-platforms-macos.md · code · keychain

Pattern match medium

Opens WebSocket connection

docs/13-deploy.md · code · Websocket

Pattern match medium

Changes file ownership

docs/02-installation.md · code · chown

Pattern match medium

setuid — privilege escalation mechanism

docs/02-installation.md · prose · downgraded · setuid

Pattern match medium

References agent memory files

docs/20-experiments.md · code · memory.md

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

docs/05-providers.md · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match medium

References tunneling service

docs/08-plugins.md · code · ngrok

Pattern match low

Popular HTTP library — network access

docs/10-platforms-macos.md · prose · downgraded · got

Pattern match low

Sets world-executable permissions

docs/13-deploy.md · prose · downgraded · chmod 700

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/C/E/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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