Caveat verdict
openclaw-aws-deploy
AWS deployment skill for OpenClaw on EC2 with SSM-only access and no inbound ports; credential_access is for AWS credentials used legitimately, secrets stored in SSM Parameter Store not in static files.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
credential_access
Findings (8)
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · code · sudo
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
references/TROUBLESHOOTING.md · prose · downgraded · curl -fsSL https://rpm.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
references/TROUBLESHOOTING.md · prose · downgraded · | bash
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh · prose · downgraded · | python3
Accesses AWS credentials file
scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws/credentials
Changes file ownership
SKILL.md · code · chown
Accesses cloud provider credentials
scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws
References agent memory files
assets/agent-defaults/AGENTS.md · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
credential_access Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.