Caveat verdict

openclaw-checkpoint

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Accesses agent memory/notes AND makes external network calls

Git-based workspace backup and restore skill; credential_store is for git credentials used legitimately, the skill explicitly excludes API keys and OAuth tokens from syncing, and install script invites users to inspect before executing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
60
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination critical

Accesses agent memory/notes AND makes external network calls — may leak personal data

LLM02 · LLM07 · ASI03 · ASI06

Capability combination critical

Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls

LLM02 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Accesses agent memory AND writes files — may modify agent behavior persistently

LLM01 · LLM06 · ASI01 · ASI06

Capability combination high

Accesses agent memory AND makes external network calls — may leak conversation history

LLM02 · LLM07 · ASI06

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Performs file operations but does not declare file-accessing binaries

file_read+write

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Accesses agent memory/configuration files

agent_memory

Findings (7)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | bash

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

SKILL.md · code · rm -rf ~

Pattern match high

Accesses shell history/config

SKILL.md · code · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match high

References SSH/GPG private keys

SKILL.md · code · ssh-key

Pattern match high

Accesses .ssh directory

SKILL.md · code · .ssh/

Pattern match medium

References agent memory files

SKILL.md · frontmatter · MEMORY.md

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outagent_memoryfile_writepackage_installcredential_store
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