Caveat verdict
claude-delegate
openclaw-claude-delegate
Local Claude Code delegation wrapper running Claude CLI as a local worker with bounded filesystem access; executionSinkDetected is from legitimate shell script dispatching with transparent setup and no credential theft.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (8)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
LAUNCH.md · code · curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StoicEnso/openclaw-claude-delegate/
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
LAUNCH.md · code · | bash
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
install.sh · prose · downgraded · | python3
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/claude-delegate.sh · prose · downgraded · TOKEN="$CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
References child_process — can spawn system processes
bin/openclaw-claude-delegate.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
README.md · prose · downgraded · sudo
Popular HTTP library — network access
LAUNCH.md · prose · downgraded · got
Changes file ownership
scripts/ensure-nonroot-delegation.sh · prose · downgraded · chown
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.