Caveat verdict
openclaw-mlx-audio
Local TTS/STT integration using Apple Silicon mlx-audio models with no cloud dependency; all audio processing stays on-device via brew/uv installed tools.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (11)
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
README.md · code · rm -rf ~
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
install.sh · prose · downgraded · curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
install.sh · prose · downgraded · | sh
References child_process — can spawn system processes
dist/index.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Uses spawn() — can execute external programs
dist/index.js · prose · downgraded · spawn(
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
install.sh · prose · downgraded · sudo
apt-get install — installs system packages
install.sh · prose · downgraded · apt-get install
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
python-runtime/stt_server.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
RELEASE_READY.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Contains shortened/invite URL
COMPLETION_REPORT.md · code · discord.gg/clawd
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
python-runtime/stt_server.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 1 system binary.
package_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.