Caveat verdict

openclaw-n8n-orchestrator

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Reads local files AND makes external network calls

Integration skill for routing OpenClaw agent API calls through n8n webhooks; explicitly designed as a credential isolation pattern to prevent the agent from touching external API keys directly, which improves security.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
50
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination critical

Reads local files AND makes external network calls — the capabilities for data exfiltration co-occur (data-flow not verified)

LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03

Capability combination critical

Reads files, encodes data, AND makes external network calls — the obfuscated-exfiltration pattern (data-flow not verified)

LLM02 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft

LLM02 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND encodes data — may obfuscate stolen credentials

LLM02 · ASI03 · ASI04

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Performs file operations but does not declare file-accessing binaries

file_read

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Findings (14)

Pattern match critical

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

SKILL.md · code · | python3

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

references/deployment.md · code · curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

references/deployment.md · code · | sh

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

references/security.md · code · rm -rf /

Pattern match high

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

references/deployment.md · prose · downgraded · | bash

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

references/deployment.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Confirmed in code medium

Accesses process.env — reads environment variables

SKILL.md · code

Pattern match medium

References webhook/callback URL

SKILL.md · code · WEBHOOK_URL

Pattern match medium

Node http/https module — low-level network access

SKILL.md · code · require('https')

Pattern match medium

Opens WebSocket connection

README.md · code · WebSocket

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

references/security.md · prose · downgraded · secretly

Pattern match low

Base64 encoding/decoding

references/security.md · prose · downgraded · base64-encode

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/validate_integration.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

scripts/validate_integration.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_innetwork_outfile_readdata_encodingcredential_access
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