ClawAudit verdict
openclaw-shield-1-0-3
The installation step clones an external GitHub repo (github.com/pfaria32/OpenClaw-Shield-Security) and immediately runs its code, creating a supply-chain risk where the external repo could be modified to deliver malicious payloads; additionally, Telegram alerting sends data to an external service.
โ Flagged for review โ coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis โ not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (2)
Accesses .ssh directory
SECURITY.md ยท prose ยท downgraded ยท .ssh/
Accesses cloud provider credentials
SECURITY.md ยท prose ยท downgraded ยท ~/.aws
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution โ cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions โ minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks โ recorded.