Caveat verdict

openclaw-sync-bridge

🟠 Risky

Significant risk patterns flagged — automated deep scan, not behavioral proof.

The install step uses curl piped to bash from an external host, and the skill syncs SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, IDENTITY.md, and all skills to a GitHub Gist, which represents a broad upload of agent identity and configuration data to a third-party service.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

security

transparency

maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Findings (5)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://clawhub.ai/JayShna/openclaw-sync-bridge/install.sh | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | bash

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

sync_bridge.py · prose · downgraded · Token: ").strip() else: token = cfg[

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

sync_bridge.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files

sync_bridge.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.copytree(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/E). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_out

Is this flag fair?

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