ClawAudit verdict
openclaw-workflow
YAML-driven deterministic workflow engine that executes scripts and LLM calls via the local OpenClaw gateway; no exfiltration or hidden behavior.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
Findings (11)
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
scripts/engine/context.py · prose · downgraded · eval(
Direct __builtins__ access — can invoke any builtin function
scripts/engine/sandbox.py · prose · downgraded · __builtins__.
Uses spawn() — can execute external programs
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · spawn (
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
scripts/engine/bridge.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/engine/bridge.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector
scripts/engine/nodes.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
command,
shell=True
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
scripts/engine/sandbox.py · prose · downgraded · exec(
os.system/popen — direct OS command execution
scripts/openclaw_workflow.py · prose · downgraded · os.execvp(
Opens WebSocket connection
scripts/engine/bridge.py · prose · downgraded · WebSocket
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/engine/context.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/engine/nodes.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 1 system binary.
network_out Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.