Caveat verdict

opencode-api

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

HTTP API client skill for calling a local OpenCode server to perform code review; data_encoding and package_install serve the documented purpose of server communication.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

13
security
70
transparency
90
maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (6)

Pattern match high

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · | Python

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

references/api-reference.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match high

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

references/lsp.md · prose · downgraded · | bash

Pattern match medium

POSTs data to external URL

references/api-reference.md · code · .post("http://

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

scripts/opencode_review.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/opencode_task.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

data_encodingpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

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