ClawAudit verdict
openrouter-model-picker
Reads local files AND makes external network calls
An interactive Canvas UI for selecting OpenRouter models and hot-updating OpenClaw configuration; fetches the OpenRouter model list, serves a local config server on 127.0.0.1:18790, and applies config changes — all local operations.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Reads local files AND makes external network calls — the capabilities for data exfiltration co-occur (data-flow not verified)
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Permission integrity
network_out
file_read
Findings (5)
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
SKILL.md · code · <script>
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
SKILL.md · code · http://127.0.0.1
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/config_server.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
scripts/fetch_models.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/fetch_models.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_innetwork_outfile_read Thanks — recorded.