ClawAudit verdict
permission-vending-machine
Human-approval gating system for sensitive agent operations, functioning as a security enhancement; notifies users via configured channels before allowing destructive operations.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (10)
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
SKILL.md · code · rm -rf /
Possible hardcoded credential
README.md · code · password: "app-specific-password
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
README.md · code · http://192.168.0.104
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
docs/ARCHITECTURE.md · prose · downgraded · | Python
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
docs/PLATFORMS.md · code · sudo
References webhook/callback URL
SKILL.md · code · webhook_url
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
src/pvm/channels/sendblue.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
os.system/popen — direct OS command execution
tests/test_wrappers.py · prose · downgraded · os.system(
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
src/pvm/approval/daemon.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Popular HTTP library — network access
src/pvm/channels/discord.py · prose · downgraded · axios
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_installnetwork_in Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.