ClawAudit verdict

skill-vetting

phenixstar-skill-vetting

🟢 Trusted

Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Security vetting skill for ClawHub skills that downloads to /tmp and scans for red flags like eval/exec and base64-encoded strings; a defensive security tool matching its stated vetting purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

security

transparency

maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Findings (17)

Pattern match critical

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

references/patterns.md · code · eval(

Pattern match critical

Dynamic __import__('os') — Python OS command execution

references/patterns.md · code · __import__('os')

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

references/patterns.md · code · rm -rf /

Pattern match critical

Accesses sensitive system files

references/patterns.md · code · /etc/passwd

Pattern match critical

Prompt injection — tries to override agent instructions

references/patterns.md · code · Ignore all previous instructions

Pattern match high

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

references/patterns.md · code · exec(

Pattern match high

Hex-encoded string — possible obfuscated payload

references/patterns.md · code · \x69\x6d\x70\x6f\x72\x74\x20\x6f\x73

Pattern match high

Accesses .ssh directory

references/patterns.md · code · .ssh/

Pattern match high

Possible prompt injection — attempts to redefine agent identity

references/patterns.md · code · You are now

Pattern match high

Fake system prompt — attempts to inject instructions

references/patterns.md · code · system: You are

Pattern match high

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

references/patterns.md · code · subprocess.run(

Pattern match high

subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector

references/patterns.md · code · subprocess.run(f'ls {user_input}', shell=True

Pattern match high

os.system/popen — direct OS command execution

references/patterns.md · code · os.system(

Pattern match medium

importlib.import_module — dynamic module loading

references/patterns.md · code · importlib.import_module(

Pattern match medium

Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files

references/patterns.md · code · shutil.rmtree(

Pattern match medium

POSTs data to external URL

references/patterns.md · code · .post('https://

Pattern match medium

Python os.getenv — reads environment variable

references/patterns.md · code · os.getenv(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_out

Is this flag fair?

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