Caveat verdict

policy-engine

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Security governance plugin enforcing allowlists and deny-patterns on tool calls via before_tool_call hooks; executionSinkDetected reflects pattern-matching on commands which is the stated purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
80
transparency
80
maintenance

Findings (8)

Pattern match high

Accesses sensitive system files

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd

Pattern match high

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

DESIGN.md · prose · downgraded · curl ... | bash

Pattern match high

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

DESIGN.md · prose · downgraded · | bash

Pattern match high

Pipe-to-shell pattern (wget | sh)

src/patterns.ts · prose · downgraded · wget -O- | sh

Pattern match high

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

src/patterns.ts · prose · downgraded · | sh

Pattern match high

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

tests/engine.test.ts · prose · downgraded · rm -rf /

Pattern match medium

Accesses .ssh directory

tests/engine.test.ts · prose · downgraded · .ssh/

Pattern match low

Base64 encoding/decoding

DESIGN.md · prose · downgraded · Base64-encode

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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