Caveat verdict

privateapp

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Personal PWA dashboard server installed and run locally via git clone and install script; builds React frontends, runs FastAPI backend locally, all operations are local infrastructure setup matching the stated personal-dashboard purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
70
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (11)

Pattern match high

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh

Pattern match high

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · | sh

Pattern match high

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · | python3

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

apps/system-monitor/backend/routes.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match medium

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

apps/system-monitor/backend/routes.py · prose · downgraded · sudo

Pattern match medium

Base64 decode (atob) — may hide malicious payloads

frontend/src/pushUtils.ts · prose · downgraded · atob(

Pattern match medium

Downloads executables from external URLs

scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · Install from https://

Pattern match medium

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/commons/openclaw_client.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

scripts/commons/openclaw_client.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Pattern match low

Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files

scripts/install.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.copy(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_inpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

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