ClawAudit verdict
prompt-injection-protection
Description-only skill documenting prompt injection protection concepts with no actual code, network calls, or credential access; executionSinkDetected is a false positive on the descriptive text.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (11)
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
README.md · code · rm -rf /
Accesses sensitive system files
README.md · code · /etc/passwd
Prompt injection — tries to override agent instructions
adaptive-demo.js · prose · downgraded · Ignore all previous instructions
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
README.md · code · sudo
Accesses AWS credentials file
complete-demo.js · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws/credentials
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
demo.js · prose · downgraded · <script>
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
index.js · prose · downgraded · |bash
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
index.js · prose · downgraded · |sh
Accesses cloud provider credentials
complete-demo.js · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws
Possible prompt injection — attempts to redefine agent identity
complete-demo.js · prose · downgraded · You are now
Accesses .ssh directory
enhanced-demo.js · prose · downgraded · .ssh/
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.