Caveat verdict

relay-gitcode-cli

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Skill wraps the gd CLI for GitCode API operations with bundled binaries and user-supplied credentials; TLS verification disabled by default is noted but this is a documented CLI behavior, not exfiltration, and all calls go to the user's configured GitCode instance.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
40
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (5)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

references/cli-workflows.md · code · TOKEN="$GD_TOKEN

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

references/gitcode-workflow-yml.md · code · curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

references/gitcode-workflow-yml.md · code · | sh

Pattern match high

References SSH/GPG private keys

references/cli-workflows.md · code · ssh-key

Pattern match high

Accesses .ssh directory

references/cli-workflows.md · code · .ssh/

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

package_installcredential_access

Is this flag fair?

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