Caveat verdict

review-agent

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Pre-meeting review coach for Lark/Feishu that runs local Python scripts to ingest documents, scan drafts, and produce decision briefs; all operations are local file processing and communication back to the originating session with no unexpected external data routing.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

10
security
100
transparency
90
maintenance

Findings (10)

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

POST_INSTALL.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

scripts/_platform.py · prose · downgraded · API_KEY="): return line.split(

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

scripts/check-updates.py · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match medium

Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly

scripts/_model.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

scripts/ingest.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match medium

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

scripts/ingest.py · prose · downgraded · sudo

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/_build_summary.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

scripts/_build_summary.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Pattern match low

Popular HTTP library — network access

scripts/_json_repair.py · prose · downgraded · got

Pattern match low

pip3 install — installs Python packages at runtime

scripts/ingest.py · prose · downgraded · pip3 install

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

Requires 1 system binary.

Is this flag fair?

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