ClawAudit verdict

save-to-spotify

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Audio content production and Spotify library management creating TTS episodes and saving to the users own Spotify account.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
70
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Findings (7)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://saveto.spotify.com/install.sh | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | bash

Pattern match high

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

references/audio-providers.md · code · silently

Pattern match high

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

references/audio-providers.md · code · subprocess.check_output(

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

references/cli-usage.md · code · sudo

Pattern match medium

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

references/cli-usage.md · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match medium

Python urllib.request — network access

references/cover-image.md · code · urllib.request

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_out

Is this flag fair?

Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API