ClawAudit verdict
secureclaw
secureclaw-skill
Security hardening ruleset aligned to OWASP/MITRE/NIST that explicitly instructs agents to treat all external content as hostile, never expose credentials, and require human approval before destructive commands — a defensive security skill with no malicious patterns.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (11)
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · |sh
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
scripts/scan-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · eval(
References child_process — can spawn system processes
configs/dangerous-commands.json · prose · downgraded · child_process
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
configs/dangerous-commands.json · prose · downgraded · sudo
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
configs/supply-chain-ioc.json · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/.env
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
scripts/scan-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · exec(
Base64 decode (atob) — may hide malicious payloads
scripts/scan-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · atob(
Sets world-executable permissions
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · chmod 777
References tunneling service
configs/privacy-rules.json · prose · downgraded · ngrok
References agent memory files
scripts/emergency-response.sh · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md
Base64 encode (btoa) — may obfuscate data exfiltration
scripts/scan-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · btoa(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.