Caveat verdict
self-evolving-agent
Korean-language agent self-improvement skill that analyzes logs and proposes AGENTS.md improvements via a multi-agent pipeline; explicitly states it only proposes changes and never modifies AGENTS.md without user approval, sending reports to Discord.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (18)
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
Possible hardcoded credential
SKILL.md · code · token: "123456:ABC-DEF...
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
CONTRIBUTING.md · code · | python3
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
docs/demo-video-plan.md · code · rm -rf /
Attempts to modify skills or system prompts
docs/clawhub-deployment-checklist.md · code · Edit SKILL.md
Accesses shell history/config
SKILL.md · code · ~/.zshrc
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
docs/reddit-drafts-v4.md · code · silently
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
CONTRIBUTING.md · code · sudo
apt-get install — installs system packages
CONTRIBUTING.md · code · apt-get install
Accesses system credential store
SECURITY.md · code · keychain
References webhook/callback URL
SKILL.md · code · webhook_url
References agent memory files
community/README.md · code · MEMORY.md
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
data/fleet/sonnet-analysis.json · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Popular HTTP library — network access
docs/launch-playbook-v4.md · code · got
References agent configuration files
docs/marketing-hn-twitter-v4.md · code · CLAUDE.md
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/analyze-behavior.sh · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
scripts/generate-proposal.sh · prose · downgraded · shutil.move(
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/v5/embedding-analyze.sh · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_inpackage_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.