Caveat verdict
janitor
session-janitor
Session hygiene tool trimming local transcripts using the local gateway API; all operations are on local files within the OpenClaw workspace.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (9)
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
ARCHITECTURE.md · code · http://127.0.0.1
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/watcher.sh · prose · downgraded · token="${DIR_TOKEN[$sessions_dir]:-}
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/extract-llm.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
scripts/janitor.sh · prose · downgraded · exec(
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
scripts/setup.sh · prose · downgraded · sudo
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/extract-llm.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
scripts/sidecar.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.move(
Popular HTTP library — network access
scripts/test-sidecar.py · prose · downgraded · got
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 2 system binaries.
package_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.