ClawAudit verdict

vps-setup

setuporion-byimpa

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls

Automates Docker Swarm + Traefik + Portainer setup on a user-owned VPS using standard apt/Docker commands; all operations are on user-provided infrastructure with standard production tooling and no unexpected external calls.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
40
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft

LLM02 · ASI03

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (7)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

SKILL.md · frontmatter · API_KEY: "Global API Key da Evolution (auto-gerada se vazia). Use openssl rand -

Pattern match critical

Accesses sensitive system files

SKILL.md · code · /etc/hosts

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | bash

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

SKILL.md · code · sudo

Pattern match high

apt-get install — installs system packages

SKILL.md · code · apt-get install

Pattern match medium

Opens WebSocket connection

SKILL.md · code · WebSocket

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outpackage_installnetwork_incredential_access
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