ClawAudit verdict
siluzan-tso
An ad platform management skill routing tasks to a locally-installed CLI, with all behavior consistent with managing advertising accounts on documented platforms; the install script uses standard package manager patterns.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (7)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
references/report-templates/google-period-report-excel.md · prose · downgraded · | python
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · curl -fsSL https://install-node.vercel.app/lts | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · | bash
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · sudo
apt-get install — installs system packages
scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · apt-get install
yum install — installs system packages
scripts/install.sh · prose · downgraded · yum install
References webhook/callback URL
assets/pmax-lead-form-template.json · prose · downgraded · WebhookUrl
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/C/E). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.