ClawAudit verdict

skill-vetter-optimized

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Fetches from network AND uses eval/Function

Enhanced version of skill-vetter with added Python check scripts and a more detailed review process; the optimization additions are legitimate tooling improvements with no malicious behavior.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
90
transparency
90
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination critical

Fetches from network AND uses eval/Function — the remote-code-execution pattern (data-flow not verified)

LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI05

Capability combination critical

Receives external input AND uses eval — the remote code-injection pattern (data-flow not verified)

LLM01 · LLM05 · ASI01 · ASI05

Capability combination critical

Receives external input AND executes processes — the shape of a command & control channel

LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI10

Capability combination critical

Encodes data AND uses eval — the obfuscated-execution pattern (atob + eval; data-flow not verified)

LLM05 · ASI05 · ASI10

Capability combination critical

Accesses agent memory/notes AND makes external network calls — may leak personal data

LLM02 · LLM07 · ASI03 · ASI06

Capability combination critical

Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls

LLM02 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Executes processes AND makes external network calls — may exfiltrate command output

LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Accesses agent memory AND makes external network calls — may leak conversation history

LLM02 · LLM07 · ASI06

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Accesses agent memory/configuration files

agent_memory

Findings (11)

Pattern match critical

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

SKILL.md · code · eval(

Pattern match high

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

SKILL.md · code · exec(

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

SKILL.md · code · sudo

Pattern match high

Accesses cloud provider credentials

SKILL.md · code · ~/.aws

Pattern match high

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

references/checklist.md · prose · downgraded · curl | bash

Pattern match high

Pipe-to-shell pattern (wget | sh)

references/checklist.md · prose · downgraded · wget | sh

Pattern match high

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

references/checklist.md · prose · downgraded · | bash

Pattern match high

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

references/checklist.md · prose · downgraded · | sh

Pattern match medium

References agent memory files

SKILL.md · code · MEMORY.md

Pattern match medium

setuid — privilege escalation mechanism

references/checklist.md · prose · downgraded · setuid

Pattern match low

Sets world-executable permissions

references/checklist.md · prose · downgraded · chmod 777

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outnetwork_inprocess_execdynamic_evalcredential_storedata_encodingagent_memory
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