ClawAudit verdict
skillboss
skillboss-2
A multi-AI API gateway skill for building full-stack apps with authenticated calls to named legitimate services via a local script wrapper with no evidence of data exfiltration.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (8)
Attempts to modify skills or system prompts
scripts/commands/document.js · prose · downgraded · edit instructions
Blob URL — may embed executable content
extensions/remotion/rules/can-decode.md · code · blob:
Accesses sensitive environment variables
extensions/remotion/rules/maps.md · code · process.env.REMOTION_MAPBOX_TOKEN
References child_process — can spawn system processes
scripts/api-hub.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
scripts/lib/client.js · prose · downgraded · Silently
Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime
templates/worker-ecommerce/tailwind.config.js · prose · downgraded · import('
Makes HTTP request to external URL
extensions/remotion/rules/compositions.md · code · fetch(`https://
References agent configuration files
workflows.md · prose · downgraded · CLAUDE.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.