ClawAudit verdict
sun-to-spotify
sun-to-spotify1
The curl|sh installer is explicitly documented as fetching from a known GitHub Pages URL for the sun-cli PyPI package; the skill's purpose (audio generation + Spotify upload) matches all described operations transparently.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (6)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://sunapp-ai.github.io/sun-to-spotify/install.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
Possible hardcoded credential
cli-usage.md · code · TOKEN="sk_live_..._...
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
SKILL.md · code · quietly
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
cli-usage.md · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
References webhook/callback URL
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · callback_url
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outpackage_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.