Caveat verdict
task-engine
Multi-agent task orchestration with Discord progress reporting; credential_access is expected for an orchestration engine that coordinates agents, and the content shows only standard state-machine task tracking with no evidence of data exfiltration or malicious behavior.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (5)
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
CLAUDE.md · code · rm -rf /
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
tests/test_cli.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
References agent configuration files
scripts/engine/dispatcher.py · prose · downgraded · agent_config
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/engine/task_store.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Popular HTTP library — network access
tests/test_state_machine.py · prose · downgraded · got
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
credential_access Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.