ClawAudit verdict

team-resurrection

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Agent team migration tool requiring user confirmation for all sensitive operations and explicitly warning about sensitive files in migration packages.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

28
security
80
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Accesses agent memory/configuration files

agent_memory

Findings (6)

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

SKILL.md · code · rm -rf ~

Pattern match medium

References agent memory files

SKILL.md · frontmatter · MEMORY.md

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

clone.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match medium

subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector

clone.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True

Pattern match medium

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

migrate.py · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match low

Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files

clone.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.copytree(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

Requires 1 system binary.

agent_memoryprocess_exec

Is this flag fair?

Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API