Caveat verdict
Tencent Cloud Infra
tencentcloud-infra
Unified Tencent Cloud infrastructure management skill using the official tccli CLI; prefers OAuth temporary credentials, requires confirmation before modifications, and explicitly biases toward queries over changes.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (6)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · | python3
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · | sh
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · rm -rf /
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · | bash
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · http://127.0.0.1
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outpackage_installdata_encodingcredential_accessnetwork_in Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.