Caveat verdict

腾讯云资源管理工具

tencentcloud-management-tool

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Accesses credentials AND encodes data

Legitimate Tencent Cloud CLI management tool (tccli) that manages cloud resources; credential access is through standard env vars/OAuth with explicit security guidance recommending temporary OAuth over permanent keys, all behavior matches the stated cloud management purpose.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
30
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND encodes data — may obfuscate stolen credentials

LLM02 · ASI03 · ASI04

Permission integrity

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (6)

Pattern match critical

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · | python3

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · | sh

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · rm -rf /

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · | bash

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

references/lighthouse-app-deploy.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

package_installdata_encodingcredential_accessnetwork_in
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