ClawAudit verdict
terminal-killer
A smart command router that executes shell commands the user types using their own shell environment; no exfiltration or deceptive behavior.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (10)
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
README.md · code · rm -rf /
Accesses shell history/config
references/TESTING.md · code · ~/.zshrc
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · code · sudo
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
README.md · prose · downgraded · curl | sh
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
README.md · prose · downgraded · | sh
References child_process — can spawn system processes
scripts/detect-command.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Uses spawn() — can execute external programs
scripts/interactive.js · prose · downgraded · spawn(
Sets world-executable permissions
README.md · prose · downgraded · chmod 777
Changes file ownership
references/builtins/linux.txt · prose · downgraded · chown
Popular HTTP library — network access
scripts/test-detector.js · prose · downgraded · Got
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.