ClawAudit verdict
tmd-wangda
A skill for automating course learning on China Mobile training platform managing progress via local session files with no unusual data exfiltration beyond the stated learning automation purpose.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (7)
Dynamic Function constructor — equivalent to eval()
scripts/stealth-extension/stealth.js · prose · downgraded · new Function(
Function.prototype.constructor access — indirect eval
scripts/stealth-extension/stealth.js · prose · downgraded · Function.prototype.constructor
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
scripts/stealth-extension/stealth.js · prose · downgraded · eval(
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/chrome_tools.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Opens WebSocket connection
references/tools.md · prose · downgraded · websocket
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/chrome_tools.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/chrome_tools.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.