Caveat verdict

toll

88
๐ŸŸข Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan โ€” automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

The skill reads local Claude Code and Codex CLI log files from ~/.claude and ~/.codex to aggregate token usage statistics; the curl install pattern is for the tool binary itself (documented), not runtime exfiltration, and all functionality matches the stated purpose of local usage tracking.

โš  Flagged for review โ€” coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis โ€” not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

20
security
80
transparency
90
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Installs packages at runtime โ€” transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (2)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) โ€” supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md ยท code ยท curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Fullstop000/toll/refs/heads/master/

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh โ€” executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md ยท code ยท | sh

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution โ€” cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

Requires 1 system binary.

network_outpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

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