Caveat verdict

toq

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Agent-to-agent communication protocol skill that installs the toq binary from toq.dev/install.sh; the install pattern is standard for CLI tools, and all operations support the stated secure agent-to-agent messaging purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
60
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (6)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -sSf https://toq.dev/install.sh | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | sh

Pattern match high

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

references/handlers.md · code · subprocess.run(

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

references/security.md · code · sudo

Pattern match medium

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

references/handlers.md · code · os.environ.get(

Pattern match medium

Popular HTTP library — network access

references/handlers.md · code · Got

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API