Caveat verdict
umeng-cli-uapp-channel-version
uapp-channel-version
The skill instructs the agent to run umeng-cli trace with the user appkey before each API call, sending the appkey to Umeng telemetry; while the main API calls are legitimate read-only analytics queries, phoning home with session-scoped user identifiers is a genuine concern beyond what the stated purpose requires.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (2)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/umeng/umeng-cli/main/scripts/instal
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | sh
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outpackage_installnetwork_indata_encoding Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.