Caveat verdict

universal-agent

45
🟠 Risky
Significant risk patterns flagged — automated deep scan, not behavioral proof.

The skill explicitly generates arbitrary shell commands or Python scripts and auto-executes them without user review, covering hardware control, CLI tools, and system administration — broad unconstrained execution beyond a specific stated purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
30
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Findings (10)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

references/README.md · code · api_key="your-key

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

references/README.md · code · curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install.sh | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

references/README.md · code · | sh

Pattern match high

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · | Python

Pattern match high

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

references/README.md · prose · downgraded · rm -rf /

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

scripts/universal_agent.py · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match medium

subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector

scripts/universal_agent.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.Popen( command, shell=True

Pattern match medium

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

scripts/universal_agent.py · prose · downgraded · exec(

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

scripts/universal_agent.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/universal_agent.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

credential_access

Is this flag fair?

Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API